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Introduction 
 
Retrospective voting theory depicts elections as a reward-punishment tool by which 
voters re-elect governments that perform well or throw out those who perform poorly 
(Key 1966; Powell 2000). However, this sanctioning mechanism relies on the 
fundamental assumption that voters are able to properly attribute responsibility for 
policy making to the incumbent government; yet, proper blame attribution is known to 
be compromised by institutional and motivational factors. The link between policy 
performance and vote choice is moderated by the clarity of responsibility of institutions: 
different political contexts generate varying degrees of difficulty for citizens in 
attributing responsibility for policy performance. It has been shown that divided power 
settings blur the lines of responsibility and make it harder for voters to hold 
governments accountable (Anderson 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and 
Palmer 1999).  
 
In addition to the challenges posed by the institutional context, retrospective voting may 
be hindered by voters’ propensity to bring responsibility judgments in line with their 
group attachments. When allocating responsibility, individuals are often motivated by a 
desire to place the groups they feel attached to in a good light. Accordingly, 
partisanship, perhaps the most common feeling of group attachment in the political 
domain, has been found to influence strongly blame attributions: partisans tend to claim 
credit for economic success to “their” party and shift blame for economic failures away 
from it and to the opposition (Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Rudolph 2003a, 2003b, 2006; 
Tilley and Hobolt 2011).  
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While it has been widely acknowledged that institutional complexity hinders voters 
from attributing responsibility correctly, it has been much less appreciated how divided 
control over policymaking also offers voters to engage in motivated responsibility 
attribution based on group identities. We argue that the institutional dispersion of power 
not only makes it harder for citizens to know which institution is responsible for policy 
outcomes, but also facilitates individuals’ rationalization of blame attributions. Namely, 
by allowing power to be shared among different parties, dispersed institutional control 
promotes the influence of partisan and other group attachments on responsibility 
judgments, which may further reduce the relationship between policy performance and 
incumbent support. The two processes have similar observable implications––i.e., low 
clarity of responsibility weakening retrospective voting––but imply markedly different 
micro-mechanisms at work. In the former scenario, the weak economic vote is due to 
voters’ inability to attribute responsibility accurately in a complex institutional setting. 
In the latter scenario, however, the same complex institutional settings facilitate 
motivated rationalizations that allow citizens to “pass the buck.” In short, we argue that 
these two processes––related to citizens’ cognitive ability and motivated reasoning, 
respectively––can unfold in parallel to weaken the retrospective vote. Although 
sometimes implied by previous research (e.g., Brown 2010; Parker-Stephen 2013), this 
latter proposition has rarely been put to a direct test. 
 
This paper attempts to do so by examining the formation of responsibility judgments in 
multilevel democracies, where the vertical division of power has been shown to weaken 
responsibility linkages (Anderson 2006). In federations and other decentralized systems, 
subnational conditions may be seen as the responsibility of either regional governments 
or the national executive. We claim that whether voters adjust their attributions of 
responsibility according to their group attachments crucially depends on which parties 
are in control of the national and regional governments. Our focus is on the influence of 
partisan and territorial attachments, both of which constitute powerful markers that 
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allow voters to distinguish governments in “us vs. them” terms. We advance the 
argument that group identifications towards parties and territories will bias attributions 
of responsibility only when the regional government and the national government 
belong to different parties that represent a relevant ingroup-outgroup conflict. 
 
We test this claim using data from one national survey experiment and five regionally 
representative surveys in Spain. In having achieved a remarkable degree of autonomy 
and displaying a variety of partisan configurations, Spanish regions offer an ideal 
context to test our argument. In line with expectations, we find that partisan bias is 
confined to contexts where different levels of government belong to different parties. 
We also find that attribution bias on the basis of territorial identities is restricted to 
regions where the government is controlled by a regional nationalist party seeking to 
advance a distinct national identity and promoting greater autonomy or even 
independence for the region. These findings have important implications for explaining 
variations in the strength of retrospective voting both across and within institutional 
contexts. 
 
The remaining of the article is organized as follows. In the following section, we put 
forward our theoretical argument and present our main hypotheses concerning the 
prevalence of attribution bias across partisan contexts. After briefly outlining the 
empirical strategy, we show the analyses of the experimental and observational studies. 
The last section summarizes the findings and discusses their implications. 
 
Attribution Bias and the Partisan Context 
 
Fiscal federalism literature has stressed the potential of federalism to enhance 
accountability and representation (Downs 1999, pp. 94–98; Rodden 2004). The 
existence of different levels of government, each one with its own functional 
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responsibilities, would bring power closer to the people, leading to a more informed 
electorate on the policies carried out by the public authorities. All of this would translate 
into a more knowledgeable scrutiny by voters who may reward or punish the different 
officeholders for their respective policy responsibilities at the specific-level elections.  
 
In contrast to these views, empirical evidence shows that multilevel polities may hinder 
the attribution of responsibilities. Contexts of vertically divided power introduce the 
“which level is responsible” question absent in unitary polities, particularly when 
different administrations share responsibilities in a policy area (León 2011). Although 
the assessment of the public’s knowledge of policy responsibilities is mixed, both 
optimistic and pessimistic accounts share the view that the attribution of responsibilities 
is a daunting task in federal contexts, which reveals substantial variation in the citizens’ 
perceptions of who is responsible for what (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004, 2008; Gomez 
and Wilson 2008; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Johns 2011). 
 
In addition to information and cognitive barriers, the formation of accurate 
responsibility judgments is further hampered by ingroup attribution bias. Individuals’ 
discrepancies on who is to be held responsible are largely conditional on their group 
identities. Social psychologists have long argued that the way individuals assign credit 
and blame is marked by a number of biases motivated by a desire to understand and 
predict events but also by a need to protect or enhance one’s self-concept and self-
esteem (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Typically, individuals accept credit for success and 
deny responsibility for failure, incurring “self-serving attribution bias”. Such bias is 
usually extended to include the groups that individuals identify with in order to maintain 
a positive sense of self-esteem from group membership in the so-called “group-serving 
attribution bias” (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Taylor and Doria 1981). Along similar lines, 
the theory of motivated reasoning posits that people’s processing of information is 
driven by two conflicting goals: accuracy goals, which motivate individuals to reach the 
“correct” conclusion; and directional goals, which motivate them to reach the preferred 
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conclusion, in line with prior beliefs (Kunda 1990). Work in public opinion shows 
group-related cues regularly trigger directional goals and in turn bias individuals’ 
political perceptions, evaluations, and choices (Taber and Lodge 2006). 
 
Partisanship is perhaps the paramount group attachment informing directional goals in 
democracies (Campbell et al. 1960). Consistently, a recurrent finding in research on 
attributions of responsibility is that voters feeling attached to a party assign credit and 
blame in a partisan manner. Specifically, partisan voters appear to balance two 
considerations when forming responsibility judgments: who is in office (their party or 
another party) and how things are going in that policy domain (are conditions good or 
bad). If one’s party is in charge, responsibility is put on the government when 
conditions are perceived to be good and elsewhere when conditions are perceived to be 
bad; similarly, opposition supporters will tend to blame the government when 
conditions are bad and dispute its credit when conditions are good. Such pattern of 
partisan disagreement in perceptions of incumbent responsibility has found ample 
support in the empirical literature (Bisgaard 2015; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003; 
Hobolt, Tilley, and Wittrock 2013; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Malhotra 2008; Malhotra 
and Kuo 2008; Marsh and Tilley 2010; Nawara 2015; Peffley and Williams 1985; 
Rudolph 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Sirin and Villalobos 2011; Stein 1990; Tilley and Hobolt 
2011). 
 
As already noted, the attribution process is necessarily twisted in contexts of divided 
power, since responsibility for policy outcomes at the subnational level can arguably be 
ascribed to more than one institution. Still, an obvious, if sometimes overlooked 
qualification is that the institutional division of powers distorts responsibility 
attributions not only because the government is shared among different institutions, but 
also because this allows the government to be shared among different parties. This 
makes a huge difference, because, as Hobolt et al. (2013, p. 165) point out, “voters are 
less concerned with identifying which part of the political system is responsible than 
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with identifying a single political party that they can reward or punish.” When levels of 
government are controlled by different parties, voters are given the opportunity to blame 
parties by allocating responsibility between institutions, thereby encouraging the 
rationalization of responsibility judgments on the basis of partisan allegiances. 
Contrarily, when responsibilities are divided institutionally but shared among officials 
from the same party, clarity of responsibility—i.e. “perceived unified control of 
policymaking” (Powell and Whitten 1993, p. 398)—is actually high, and there is less 
room for the motivated bias of attributions. Partisan motivated reasoning is activated by 
competition between parties (Druckman et al. 2013; Rudolph 2006). Hence it is the 
partisan division of power which facilitates the rationalization of attributions.  
 
In sum, we expect that the influence of partisanship on responsibility judgments will 
vary consistently with both the partisan context and perceptions of the policy 
conditions. In a multilevel setting, this implies that the partisan rationalization of 
attributions on the basis of perceptions of the regional conditions should be confined to 
contexts where the regional government is controlled by an out-party incumbent, that is, 
a party other than the national government’s party. When the regional government is 
controlled by an in-party incumbent (i.e., belongs to the same party as the national 
incumbent) no partisan differentiation should emerge in the attribution of responsibility 
between levels of government.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Partisan-based attribution bias will be restricted to regions with 
out-party incumbents; in such contexts, partisan differences in attributions will 
vary systematically with perceptions of the regional economy, such that the 
closer the voters feel to the regional incumbent the more willing they are to put 
the responsibility for positive outcomes on the regional government vis-à-vis the 
national government. 
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This same rationale may be extended to other types of group attachment. Regions 
provide an additional basis for powerful and enduring group identifications, particularly 
when regional divisions overlap ethnic or linguistic boundaries (Fitjar 2010). Regional 
and national identities might link individuals to distinctive decentralization preferences 
and eventually to alternative national projects, represented by region-specific parties 
(Chernyha and Burg 2012). The existence of regional entities along with a national 
government makes it possible for feelings toward the corresponding territorial 
communities to come into play.  
 
Compared to research on partisan attribution bias, few studies have explicitly examined 
the effects of territorial identities on responsibility judgments in federations. An 
exception is research showing that voters’ adjustment of their perceptions of 
responsibility between the domestic and European institutions to performance 
evaluations is contingent on their feelings toward the European Union––which are, to a 
large extent, informed by national identity (Hobolt, Tilley, and Wittrock 2013; Hobolt 
and Tilley 2014). In multilevel settings with contending territorial identities, feelings of 
attachment to distinctive territorial communities may consequently be thought to bias 
attributions in a way very much like partisan identities: individuals who feel 
predominantly attached to their region will tend to deny the central government any 
responsibility for positive outcomes and blame it for negative outcomes, while 
individuals predominantly attached to the nation will be more willing to blame the 
regional government for failures and shift credit for success from the regional to the 
central government. 
 
It might be argued that attribution bias related to territorial identities does not require 
partisan division to be activated, since attachment to territorial communities directly 
links citizens to the corresponding levels of government independently of which parties 
are in office. This might arguably be the case in regions with pervasive alternative 
national identities, like Quebec, Scotland, or Catalonia. However, even in such 
8 
 
instances, people with exclusive territorial identities have few reasons to defend a 
government controlled by a party that does not share their national project. If, as just 
argued, the influence of group-based predispositions on political perceptions is triggered 
by conflict between political actors representing those groups, we should expect that the 
influence of territorial identities on attributions will be activated in contexts where the 
regional government is controlled by a regional nationalist party—an out-party 
incumbent by definition.1 It is precisely in these contexts where voters can more easily 
connect a specific level of government with a particular in- or outgroup, i.e., they can 
associate each tier of government with the promotion of the interests of alternative 
national groups. By making the center-periphery divide more salient, nationalist 
governments should prompt the influence of territorial identities on attributions of 
responsibility.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Attribution bias on the basis of territorial identities will be 
confined to regions with nationalist incumbents; in such contexts, differences in 
attributions between identity groups will vary systematically with perceptions of 
the regional economy, such that the closer the voters feel to the region the more 
willing they are to put the responsibility for positive outcomes on the regional 
government vis-à-vis the national government. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
Case Study 
 
The Spanish State of Autonomies provides a key test for the previous hypotheses. The 
Spanish regions share a similar institutional setting, but are heterogeneous in terms of 
                                                 
1 For ease of presentation, we henceforth use the unqualified term “nationalist” to refer only to regional 
nationalist parties, i.e. region-specific parties that claim nationhood for a region and aim to empower it by 
promoting self-government or independence. See Hepburn (2009) for a discussion of the different labels 
used to classify this party family in the literature.  
9 
 
the regional governments’ economic responsibilities and party system configuration. 
This allows us to take advantage of the subnational comparative method (Snyder 2001): 
by focusing on subnational cases within a single country, we control for factors such as 
the regions’ government institutions or the characteristics of the national political 
system to a far greater extent than is possible in studies that compare units within 
different federations. 
 
The process of decentralization in Spain established seventeen regions with their own 
democratically-elected institutions. Four of these regions were granted the maximum-
level of self-government allowed by the Spanish constitution at the outset (the so-called 
fast-track regions), whereas the other thirteen had to wait for five years before being 
able to increase their powers (Colomer 1998). Yet, the evolution of the decentralization 
process has equalized the responsibilities attributed to these two types of regions to such 
an extent that few differences exist in terms of regional policy responsibilities across 
regions (Aja 2014). However, revenue powers constitute an important difference; 
whereas the central government levies and collects most taxes in the 15 regions 
financed under the “common regime”—and later redistributes the revenues among these 
regions with the aim of producing fiscal equalization—the Basque provinces and 
Navarre enjoy fiscal autonomy, so they possess their own treasuries, they are fully 
responsible for most of the taxes, and enjoy more flexibility to lower or raise the rates of 
income or corporate tax (Bosch and Duran 2008). The central government is, therefore, 
the main responsible for fiscal policy in all regions with the exception of the Basque 
Country and Navarre. 
 
Yet, the major source of differences between regions is the strength of regional 
identities and the distinctiveness of their party systems. In some regions, regional 
identities are linked to alternative national projects, championed by nationalist parties, 
whereas in other regions distinctive territorial identities are less spread and unconnected 
with nationhood claims (Moreno et al. 1998). As a result, regional party systems differ 
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in varying degrees from the national party system. In most of the regions, the electoral 
competition is dominated by Spanish-wide parties, so the regional government is held 
by either the incumbent or the main opposition party in central government institutions. 
By contrast, in other regions and, particularly, in the Basque Country and Catalonia, the 
regional incumbent (or the main opposition party) is usually a region-specific nationalist 
party that stands for the promotion of the region’s interests (Pallarés and Keating 2003). 
 
Data 
 
This study employs two sources of data. First, we draw on an online survey experiment 
conducted in October of 2013 on a Spanish-wide sample of internet users (N=843).2 
The experiment allows us to ascertain the extent to which citizens bring their 
responsibility judgments in line with their partisan and regional attachments when 
exposed to varying information about their region’s economic performance, and how 
those adjustments are moderated by the regional partisan context. The study was 
designed to address the concerns over reverse causality that often arise when examining 
observational data, and specifically to control for the possibility that voters are biasing 
their perceptions of the economy according to prior identities and responsibility 
judgments (Tilley and Hobolt 2011).  
 
Our second source of data comes from a survey study administered face-to-face to five 
regionally representative samples between October 2007 and March 2008.3 The regions 
were selected to capture regional diversity regarding the prevalence of distinctive 
                                                 
2 The experiment was embedded in a wave of an online panel survey of the Spanish population. Due to 
Internet use sharply decreasing with age, the original sample is restricted to young and middle aged adults 
(respondents’ age ranges between 18 and 48 years in our sample). Quotas were applied for sex, age, 
education, and region, thus enabling to examine how different regional partisan contexts moderate the 
degree of bias in responsibility judgements. Respondents from the Canary Islands and Navarre are 
excluded from the analysis as the questionnaire did not include a measure of proximity to these regions’ 
incumbents (Coalición Canaria and Unión del Pueblo Navarro, respectively). 
3 The data were collected by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (study no. 2734). Regional 
sample sizes range between 1,490 and 2,400. 
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territorial identities and regional party system configurations. Regional identities are 
predominantly strongest in the Basque Country and Catalonia, which also contain the 
most idiosyncratic party systems—each with at least two relevant nationalist parties, 
one of them consistently among the top two in either regional or national elections. 
Nationalism is pervasive but less widespread in Galicia, where the Bloque Nacionalista 
Gallego gets representation in the regional chamber but rarely challenges the main 
national parties. In Andalusia, although distinctive feelings of regional attachments are 
non-negligible, region-wide formations have only attained minor and sporadic success. 
Finally, region-specific parties are irrelevant in Castilla y León, where regional identity 
is systematically shared with the Spanish identity. 
 
Combining the survey experiment with regional surveys greatly improves the external 
validity of our results. The use of regionally representative, face-to-face surveys allows 
us to obtain fine-grained, region-by-region descriptive evidence of differences in 
responsibility attributions when respondents in a real-world situation are not explicitly 
given an economic treatment. Furthermore, the fact that the experimental and the 
observational studies were drawn at different points in time allows us to test if the same 
pattern of attribution bias emerges under very different political and economic contexts. 
 
On the one hand, the two studies were collected under different partisan configurations. 
By late 2007, when the five-region study was conducted, the Socialist party (PSOE) led 
a minority government, to be reissued in 2008; in 2013, when the experiment was 
carried out, it was the conservatives (PP) who were in office at the national level, after 
attaining a majority in the 2011 snap election. As shown in Table 1, some regions also 
underwent government change following their respective regional elections, mostly at 
the expense of the Socialists. As a result, two of the regions under in-party governments 
in the 2007 study (Andalucía and Catalonia) featured an out-party government in 2013, 
while the other (Galicia) remained in-party as the Socialists lost the regional 
government to the PP. Castilla y León, which featured an out-party government in 2007, 
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became an in-party region after the conservatives won the national government, while 
the Basque Country remained under the out-party government of the Basque 
nationalists. Finally, the Catalan government, led by the Socialists in 2007, was back in 
the hands of the nationalists at the time of our experiment. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Additionally, our studies differ markedly as to the economic situation of the country at 
the time of data collection. By the end of 2007, the Spanish economy had just started to 
show signs of deterioration after a long period of buoyance boosted by the housing 
bubble; by 2013, the country was still undergoing the second wave of the deepest 
recession in decades, and the banking system had only recently been bailed out. Yet, the 
economy was certainly showing some signs of recovery. The national GDP grew in the 
third quarter of 2013 for the first time in more than two years; unemployment, while 
reaching a historic peak of 26.9 per cent in the first quarter, started to recede 
subsequently for the first time in five years. Therefore, the data used in this paper covers 
a diverse range of time-varying political contexts and distinct economic circumstances, 
which significantly enhances the external validity of the results. 
 
Results 
The Survey Experiment 
 
As sketched above, our experiment’s main goal was to establish the causal status of 
performance evaluations and voters’ attachments in biasing the formation of 
responsibility judgments between levels of government. To ascertain the extent of 
attribution bias, we examined the effect of exposing citizens to information about 
regional economic performance on their attributions of responsibility. We used a 
between-subjects, one-shot design where respondents were randomly assigned to one of 
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three conditions with varying information about the recent evolution of the economic 
situation in the respondent’s region of residence. In the positive information condition, 
respondents were told: “Some of the more recent data show signs of improvement in the 
state of the economy in [region] during the last quarter.” In the negative information 
condition, the same wording was used but the term “improvement” was replaced by 
“downturn.” Respondents assigned to the control condition were not presented any 
information about the evolution of the regional economy. Next, all respondents were 
asked two questions: “To what extent do you think the regional government is 
responsible for the state of the economy in [region]?” and “To what extent do you think 
the national government is responsible for the state of the economy in [region]?”  
 
The dependent variable in our models is the net regional attribution, that is, the 
difference between the regional government attribution score and the national 
government attribution score—an operationalization that has been argued to more 
accurately capture the attribution of responsibility in multilevel systems (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2014; see also Rudolph 2016). This net regional score theoretically ranges from 
−10 to +10, where −10 means that the national government is assigned all the 
responsibility and +10 indicates the regional government is fully responsible. 
 
In order to test for partisan bias in responsibility judgments, the net regional attribution 
is regressed on the interaction between economic information (our treatment) and the 
individual’s partisanship. This interaction ascertains how partisan groups differently 
adjust their responsibility attributions to information about how the economy is doing. 
Of key interest to our analysis, however, is the three-way interaction between economic 
information, voters’ partisanship, and the partisanship of the regional government, as it 
tests the extent to which partisan bias varies across regions as a function of the in-party 
or out-party condition of the regional incumbent. Two dummy variables are used to 
identify the positive and the negative information conditions, the control group serving 
as the baseline category. Partisanship is captured by a question measuring how close 
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respondents feel to the leading incumbent party, on a 5-point scale recoded to run from 
0 (most distant) to 1 (closest). Finally, a dummy variable identifies regions with an out-
party regional incumbent relative to regions with an in-party incumbent, as reported in 
Table 1.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
Table 2 contains the results of the OLS model. Following Hypothesis 1, we expect 
partisan bias to be confined to regions where a party other than the national incumbent 
is in office. In order to allow for partisan bias to vary by the partisanship of the regional 
government, our model includes a three-way interaction between each of the treatments, 
respondents’ proximity to the regional incumbent, and region type, along with all of 
their constituent terms. The joint-hypothesis F-test of the coefficients in the three-way 
interaction is statistically significant (p < 0.01), indicating that the extent to which 
attributions are shaped by a combination of performance evaluations and feeling 
towards the incumbent is dependent on the partisanship of the regional incumbent. 
Indeed, the estimates imply that there is no attribution bias in regions with an in-party 
regional incumbent (the joint-hypothesis test of the treatment × proximity interaction is 
not statistically significant, p > 0.1), whereas they provide strong evidence of bias in 
regions with an out-party incumbent (p < 0.01).  
 
Given the intricacies involved in the interpretation of multiple interaction models, 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the estimated effects. The first panel shows that, in 
regions with an in-party incumbent, the predicted attribution scores remain basically the 
same across conditions for both those feeling very close to the incumbent (1 on the 0-1 
proximity scale) and those feeling very distant (0). Yet, as shown in the second panel, 
stark differences are visible in out-party regions. For someone feeling very close to the 
incumbent, the model predicts a score of −2.6 on the −10 to +10 attribution scale when 
confronted with bad news about the regional economy, meaning that substantially more 
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responsibility is ascribed to the national government than is to the regional government. 
When faced with good news, the same individual is predicted a score of 1.8, which 
entails that the regional government is held more responsible than the national 
government. By contrast, those that feel very distant from the incumbent seem largely 
unaffected by the valence of the information given, according to the model. It is 
important to note, however, that such individuals score significantly higher than 
government supporters on the regional attribution scale when exposed to negative 
performance information, and significantly lower when exposed to positive 
information.4 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
We next examined Hypothesis 2, according to which the rationalization of attributions 
on the basis of territorial identity would be conditional of the regional government being 
led by a nationalist party. To operationalize individuals’ territorial identity, we use a 
forced-choice question asking respondents whether they feel “Only Spanish”, “More 
Spanish than from the region”, “As much Spanish as from the region”, “More from the 
region than Spanish”, or “Only from the region”, which was recoded to run from 0 to 1. 
A dummy variable identifies regions under a nationalist incumbent (i.e., Catalonia and 
the Basque Country). The results are displayed in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
The estimates confirm that rationalizations driven by territorial identity vary 
significantly by region (the coefficients in the three-way interaction are jointly 
significant at p < 0.05). As illustrated in Figure 2, respondents at both ends of the 
                                                 
4 We replicated the analysis using respondents’ proximity to the national incumbent instead of their 
proximity to the regional incumbent. The results, presented in section A of the Supplemental Appendix, 
show a pattern similar to that found in the present analysis, such that closeness to the PP consistently 
moderates the adjustment of responsibility attributions to the valence of information in regions with an 
out-party incumbent, but not in regions with an in-party incumbent. 
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identity scale in regions under a non-nationalist incumbent are hardly distinguishable in 
their responsibility attributions and these appear to be unaffected by information on the 
situation of the regional economy (the treatment × identity interaction is not statistically 
significant, p > 0.1). In contrast, respondents in regions with a nationalist incumbent 
responded differently to the treatments based on their prior territorial attachments 
(p < 0.01). As shown in the rightmost panel, the attribution of responsibility to the 
regional government vis-à-vis the national government increases by 4.1 points in 
average among individuals feeling attached only to the region when exposed to positive 
information about the regional economy, as compared to when faced with negative 
information, while it decreased by 1.4 points among those reporting an exclusive 
Spanish identity. The analysis of variations by territorial identity thus lends support to 
Hypothesis 2.  
 
 [Figure 2] 
 
The findings thus provide strong evidence in support of the idea that rationalizations by 
virtue of partisan and territorial identities are activated in contexts where the 
combination of government arrangements at the national and regional levels promotes 
the confrontation along those same alignments. As expected, the partisan bias of 
responsibility judgments is restricted to regions where the regional incumbent is from 
another party than the national incumbent, while attribution bias driven by territorial 
attachments is only visible in regions where the government is led by a nationalist 
party.5 
 
Our results also suggest that the information provided in the negative treatment, for the 
most part, matched the existing, heavily pessimistic impressions of the Spanish citizens 
at the time of the study, and hence failed to motivate a change in their attributions of 
                                                 
5 These results are robust to alternative specifications of the proximity and identity variables, as shown in 
section B of the Supplemental Appendix. 
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responsibility. Indeed, responsibility judgments of those exposed to negative 
information about the regional situation do not significantly depart from those in the 
control group. It is worth noting, however, that attribution scores within both the control 
and negative information groups differ markedly by partisan and territorial 
identifications in regions with an out-party incumbent and with a nationalist 
government, respectively. The contrast is particularly pronounced in connection to 
territorial attachment: respondents with predominantly Spanish feelings tend to 
disproportionately ascribe responsibility for the region’s economy to the regional 
government, while respondents with predominantly regional feelings disproportionately 
blame the national government. This pattern of differences points to the existence of 
pretreatment effects: participants in our experiment had already been exposed to 
(overwhelmingly dull) “real-world” economic evidence and news and adjusted their 
responsibility attributions accordingly, based on their group identifications (Gaines et 
al. 2007). That systematic differences within the negative treatment and control groups 
only emerge in regions with out-party or nationalist governments, but not in those free 
of cross-government divergence, attests to rationalization processes in line with the 
posited hypotheses. It is to the systematic analysis of the effects of such “real-world” 
conditions that we turn to in the next section. 
 
The Five-Region Study 
 
As we sketched above, the five regions sampled in this study were selected to represent 
the myriad of social, political, and historical circumstances occurring in the Spanish 
“state of autonomies.” The five-region survey provides a perfect mix of regionally 
representative samples to test our hypotheses about the moderating role of partisan 
contexts in the group-serving rationalization of attributions. Andalusia, Catalonia, and 
Galicia featured in-party (and consequently non-nationalist) governments; accordingly, 
we would not expect attributions of responsibility to be biased on the basis of neither 
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partisan nor territorial affinities. Castilla y León featured an out-party, non-nationalist 
government, hence we would expect attributions to be biased on the basis of 
partisanship but not territorial identity. Finally, the Basque Country featured a 
nationalist (and consequently out-party) government, so we would expect attributions to 
be biased on the basis of both partisan and territorial identities. 
 
Given that sample sizes are large enough to be representative at the regional level, the 
same model is estimated separately for each of the five regions. Sample size also allows 
the two posited bias mechanisms to be estimated concomitantly. Hence respondents’ 
attributions of responsibility are regressed on the reported regional economic 
performance and the interaction of this with government support on the one hand, and 
with territorial identity on the other.  
 
To measure the attribution of responsibilities, we use two questions asking respondents 
how much the national and the regional governments has each influenced the recent 
evolution of the region’s economy, as reported on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at 
all” to “a great deal”. Our dependent variable is the difference between the influence 
ascribed to the regional government and the influence ascribed to the national 
government. The resulting net regional attribution score is coded to run from −1 to 1, 
where −1 means that the national government is assigned all the responsibility and 1 
means that the regional government is fully responsible. Regional economic 
performance is operationalized using respondents’ retrospective assessment of the 
region’s economy, measured on a 5-point scale from “much worse” to “much better”. 
Following Hobolt et al. (2013), incumbent support is captured using an 11-point 
evaluation of the regional government’s record. To measure territorial identity, we again 
employ the 5-point scale ranging from “only Spanish” to “only from the region”. 
Finally, the models include controls for respondents’ sex, age, educational attainment, 
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and political knowledge.6 All independent variables (but age) are coded to range from 0 
to 1. Table 4 shows the regression estimates for each of the five regions. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The results are largely consistent with the posited hypotheses. In line with Hypothesis 1, 
the interaction between impressions of the economy and government evaluation is not 
statistically significant in regions with an in-party incumbent, which indicates that 
citizens are not adjusting their responsibility judgments according to their ingroup 
identities. Based on the estimates in Table 4, Figure 3 compares the relationship 
between net regional attributions and assessments of economic performance among 
government supporters (those giving it the highest rating) to that among opponents 
(lowest), while setting all other variables at their observed values. The figure clearly 
illustrates that in Andalusia, Catalonia, and Galicia differences in the slopes of 
economic performance between the two groups are negligible. Conversely, we find 
evidence of partisan bias in the out-party regions of Castilla y León and, to a lesser 
extent, the Basque Country. The interaction between economic performance and 
government evaluation is highly significant in the former case: as shown in the 
corresponding panel of Figure 3, the likelihood of attributing responsibility for the 
economy to the regional government vis-à-vis the national government among 
supporters of the Castilian incumbent increases as economic assessments become more 
positive, while exactly the reverse is true among the incumbents’ opponents. 
Differences are much less pronounced (albeit significant at the p < 0.1 level) in the 
Basque country, where only the most enthusiastic supporters of the regional government 
appear to slightly adjust their responsibility attributions according to their perceptions of 
the economy.  
 
                                                 
6 Education is measured using a 4-level variable: Primary or less, lower secondary, higher secondary, 
university. Political knowledge is an additive index based on six factual items. 
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[Figures 3 and 4] 
 
Finally, the results in Table 4 show that only in the Basque Country is the interaction 
between economic performance and territorial identity statistically significant, 
indicating that, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, rationalization driven by territorial 
attachment is confined to regions with nationalist governments. As shown in Figure 4, 
voters feeling only Basque are more likely to assign the responsibility for the region’s 
economy to the regional government the more positive their assessment of the region’s 
economic situation, whereas voters feeling only Spanish tend to give more credit to the 
national government as their perception of the region’s economic situation improves. In 
regions with non-nationalist incumbents, however, territorial identity does not appear to 
meaningfully shape attributions of responsibility. It is worth noting that territorial 
identity makes no difference even in Catalonia, in spite of widespread feelings of 
regional attachment and a deeply ingrained history of nationalist mobilization––or in 
Galicia or even Andalusia, both also with remarkable regionalist records. Just as 
partisan bias apparently requires the partisan confrontation across governments to be 
activated, territorial bias does not seem to occur unless a regional incumbent plays the 
territorial card against the national government.7 
 
Discussion 
 
This study has provided strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the vertical 
division of power facilitates group-based attribution bias in contexts where different 
parties rule over different levels of government, but not in contexts where the regional 
                                                 
7 In order to subject our hypotheses to a more formal test and to allow a clearer comparison with the 
analysis of the experiment, we also estimated a series of general models pooling all regions together and 
including interactions between perceptions of the economy, government support/territorial identity, and 
dummy variables identifying regions with out-party/nationalist incumbents. The estimates, shown in 
section D of the Supplemental Appendix, consistently indicate that the three-way interactions are 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) and the effects are in the expected direction, suggesting that attribution 
bias is dependent on the region’s partisan context. 
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incumbent belongs to the same party as the national incumbent. Our experiment reveals 
partisan motivated reasoning in action: even if the treatments did not directly prime 
directional goals, when offered the opportunity to counter-argue a valenced assessment 
of the regional economy, voters in out-party regions systematically adjusted their 
responsibility judgments to reach a conclusion that is more in line with their group 
attachments. By contrast, the attributions of voters under in-party regional governments 
are not consistently affected by information about the economy. The analysis of the 
observational data further validates the key role of partisan conflict in activating 
directional motives.  
 
Our findings have likely important implications for research on the prevalence of 
economic voting across institutional contexts. Starting with Powell and Whitten (1993), 
scholars have shown that the dispersion of power blurs the lines of responsibility, 
eroding the citizens’ ability to allocate credit and blame and ultimately hindering the 
extent to which governments are held to account for policy outcomes. The implied 
assumption is often that an accurate allocation of responsibility under conditions of 
divided power is more cognitively demanding, i.e. requires more effort and information 
from voters (e.g., Cutler 2004; Gomez and Wilson 2008). The evidence provided in this 
paper helps identify attribution bias as an additional mechanism by which low clarity of 
responsibility may hinder debilitate retrospective voting. To the degree that voters are 
allowed to allocate the responsibility to different parties, divided government creates 
incentives for them to engage in credit taking and blame shifting on the basis of their 
predispositions, which in turn weakens the relationship between economic conditions 
and government support. 
 
This reasoning is consistent with a number of works showing that the strength of 
performance voting is reduced when power is shared among different parties: in cases 
of “divided government,” where the ruling party in the executive does not control a 
majority of seats in the legislature (Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Lowry et al. 1998); under 
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conditions of partisan “cohabitation” in semi-presidential systems (Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau 2000); and in subnational elections not involving incumbents of the national 
executive’s party (Atkeson and Partin 1995; León and Orriols 2016; Stein 1990). It also 
conforms to Hobolt et al.’s (2013) finding that it is the partisan cohesion of government, 
rather than the institutional concentration of power, that moderates the impact of 
performance evaluations on incumbent support. All of these examples suggest that 
variations in the partisan distribution of power moderate retrospective voting under 
equivalent institutional arrangements. The role of institutional arrangements cannot be 
fully understood aside from the partisan context and its influence on the likelihood of 
attribution bias. Further research should be aimed at disentangling the relative 
contribution of attribution bias vis-à-vis cognitive complexity in explaining the 
conditioning effect of institutions on performance voting. 
 
Our study has also addressed the largely unexplored role of territorial identities in 
shaping responsibility judgments in federations. It has been demonstrated that such 
feelings of attachment may indeed bias attributions in a similar way than partisanship. 
However, the mere presence of alternative national identities, as is the case of Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, does not appear to automatically translate into the adjustment 
of attributions in favor of a particular level of government. Rather, the results in this 
paper indicate that substantial rationalizations driven by territorial attachments only 
occur when regional governments are controlled by nationalist parties. Under such 
circumstances, voters with strong feelings of regional (national) identification will tend 
to claim successes for the regional (national) government, holding constant their 
partisan allegiances. 
 
Further research will be needed to examine how territorial identities affect responsibility 
judgments in other contexts and to validate the role of partisan competition in 
channeling their influence. We would in principle expect a pattern similar to that found 
here in other multilevel democracies with strong regional attachments, such as Belgium, 
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Canada, or the United Kingdom. Given its peculiar organization of government and the 
lack of a comparable party system, much is to be learned yet about the role of 
incumbency and territorial identities in shaping responsibility attributions in the context 
of the European Union––particularly in view of the growing success of parties with a 
strong nationalist agenda across the continent. 
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Table 1 Party of the head of the incumbent government in the regions covered in the 
studies 
 
Survey experiment 
(2013) 
Five-region study 
(2007-08) 
National government PP PSOE 
Regional governments   
Andalusia PSOE† PSOE 
Aragón PP  
Asturias PSOE†  
Cantabria PP  
Castilla y León PP PP† 
Castilla-La Mancha PP  
Catalonia CiU‡ PSC 
Comunitat Valenciana PP  
Extremadura PP  
Galicia PP PSOE 
Balearic Islands PP  
La Rioja PP  
Madrid PP  
Murcia PP  
Basque Country PNV‡ PNV‡ 
† Non-nationalist out-party incumbents; ‡ Nationalist out-party incumbents. Although 
formally a separate party, the Catalan PSC is a federal partner with the PSOE. 
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Table 2 The role of proximity to regional incumbent in attributions of responsibility, 
2013 
Treatment (ref.=Control):  
Negative -0.11 
 (0.38) 
Positive -0.08 
 (0.37) 
Proximity to regional incumbent 0.29 
 (0.69) 
Out-party incumbent 0.27 
 (0.48) 
Negative × Proximity -0.06 
 (0.97) 
Positive × Proximity -0.64 
 (1.04) 
Negative × Out-party 0.53 
 (0.64) 
Positive × Out-party 0.04 
 (0.69) 
Out-party × Proximity -2.48* 
 (1.10) 
Negative × Proximity × Out-party -1.18 
 (1.48) 
Positive × Proximity × Out-party 4.21** 
 (1.61) 
Constant 0.18 
 (0.27) 
R-squared 0.06 
Observations 812 
Unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 3 The role of territorial identity in attributions of responsibility, 2013 
Treatment (ref.=Control):  
Negative -0.71 
 (0.52) 
Positive -0.50 
 (0.54) 
Identity -1.10 
 (0.77) 
Nationalist incumbent 3.12** 
 (0.95) 
Negative × Identity 1.70 
 (1.04) 
Positive × Identity 1.10 
 (1.07) 
Negative × Nationalist 0.33 
 (1.27) 
Positive × Nationalist -1.32 
 (1.38) 
Nationalist × Identity -6.05** 
 (1.54) 
Negative × Identity × Nationalist -1.55 
 (2.04) 
Positive × Identity × Nationalist 4.63* 
 (2.33) 
Constant 0.68+ 
 (0.38) 
R-squared 0.11 
Observations 812 
Unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 4 The role of partisan and territorial attachments in attributions of responsibility 
in five regions, 2007-8 
 Andalusia 
Castilla y 
León Catalonia Galicia 
Basque 
Country 
Economic performance 0.01 -0.67** 0.04 0.03 -0.43** 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) 
Government support -0.01 -0.98** -0.00 -0.01 -0.27* 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) 
Territorial identity -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 0.08 -0.23* 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) 
Economy × Support -0.04 1.76** 0.10 0.11 0.32+ 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.14) (0.09) (0.20) 
Economy × Territorial id 0.16 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.69** 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) 
R-squared 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.08 
Observations 1,194 1,002 1,284 1,992 1,038 
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Constant 
and controls for sex, age, education, and political knowledge not shown. 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Fig. 1 Responsibility attributions by experimental condition, proximity to regional 
incumbent, and partisan context 
 
Note: predicted values and 95% confidence intervals based on the estimates in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Responsibility attributions by experimental condition, territorial identity, and 
partisan context 
 
Note: predicted values and 95% confidence intervals based on the estimates in Table 3. 
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Fig. 3 Responsibility attributions by evaluation of the regional economy and 
government support in five regions 
 
Note: predicted values and 95% confidence intervals based on the estimates in Table 4. 
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Fig. 4 Responsibility attributions by evaluation of the regional economy and territorial 
identity in five regions 
 
Note: predicted values and 95% confidence intervals based on the estimates in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
